Convoy of HCUA and MAA (separatist) fighters

On Thursday October 6, unidentified gunmen carried out an attack targeting security forces at the Tazalite refugee camp in the Tahoua Region, Niger. As many as 22 of the camps security forces composed of Nigerien soldiers, gendarmes and guards were left dead and additionally 5 wounded. Many indicators pointed at jihadist groups like AQIM, al-Mourabitoune or ISGS (MUJAO’s new outfit) roaming the Sahelian border zones as the likely perpetrators, events in the wake of the attack during the last days may suggest otherwise.

The Nigerien Minister of National Defense Hassoumi Massaoudou quickly pointed at what he described as narco-terrorists likely from the Kidal region and Tinzawatène in comments to RFI, he further stated that there is no distinction between groups like AQIM, Ansar Dine, HCUA and drugtraffickers. These comments were later condemned in a statement issued by CMA/HCUA spokesman Almouzamile Ag Mohamed.

Accumulating reports and comments by Nigerien officials signalled that the attackers came from Mali and returned in that same direction. The days that followed the Tazalite attack came to show the serious ramifications the attack would have inside Malian territory. In the early morning on the Saturday that followed, almost two days after the events in Tazalite local sources reported that French forces of Operation Barkhane in Tinzawatène, far north Kidal region, conducted a counter-terrorism operation carrying out multiple arrests including an airstrike that destroyed a CMA technical and the fighter on board the vehicle named as Mossa Ag Abdi, the buried bodies of two others were later found by locals.

Further south in the area of Ménaka unidentified gunmen on board light trucks attacked the localities of Sahène and Tinasben, an area where Imghad nomads dwell, also a control zone of the pro-Mali/loyalist militia GATIA. Reports speak of 3 dead, multiple wounded and 17 people abducted following the attack, all being civilians. The assailants reportedly burned but also seized vehicles, a local source reported that CMA fighters was behind the attack, we can not exclude the possibility that it could be the same group of people that attacked the Tessalite refugee camp, although caution recommended against jumping to conclusions since this narrative serves GATIA who’s activists rapidly took the oppurtunity to put blame on its archrival claiming that the militia did not have an military control points in the area, later publishing a list of the victims of the attack. Furthermore, the Nigerien Minister of National Defense Massaoudou further confirmed that Nigerien armed forces conducted an extensive combing operation in this particular zone in pursuit of the perpetrators, it is as much possible that vindictive Nigerien soldiers carried out the atrocities that took place in the area.

Like the events already mentioned not being enough, this particular Saturday in Mali would take an even more dramatic turn, with an explosion reported close to the MINUSMA base in Kidal around 18h00 local time, as more details emerged it became clear that the High Council for the Unity of Azawad’s (HCUA) Chief of Staff Cheikh Ag Aoussa had been killed in the blast. Ag Aoussa was a controversial character being the second in command after Iyad Ag Ghaly within the local AQ front group Ansar Dine, although leaving timingly with the beginning of the French Operation Serval for the more moderate camp to end up as being HCUA’s military commander. Ag Aoussa was more then just a military commander for a local separatist faction, he was an emblematic figure within the Tuareg rebel movement for decades, a person with a long history, having partaken in the Lebanon War and the Libyan-Chadian Conflict before returning to Mali to participate in the Tuareg Rebellion of the 90’s. Ag Aoussa’s death comes at a critical time with a security situation continuing to detoriate with the wider region of ‘Azawad’ and Mopti pulled down in a deep cycle of violence.

Many questions surrounding Ag Aoussa’s death remain unanswered, just before being killed in a suspected IED detonation or car-bomb explosion, Ag Aoussa attended a biweekly security meeting at the MINUSMA base with other respresentatives from CMA, MINUSMA and the French military mission Operation Barkhane. The explosion that struck his vehicle occurred 320 meters from the MINUSMA camp’s main gate. Most of the damages on the vehicle were fire damages, with the hood of the vehicle bent up indicating that something exploded under the front of the vehicle. Judging by the damages a seemingly small device, likewise a very small crater suggesting that a sticky bomb was placed under the vehicle or an IED on top of the road disguised as trash. Out of these two hypotheses, Ag Aoussa’s people from CMA/HCUA issued a statement in which they distinctly favored the former, asserting that the killing of Ag Aoussa was a targeted assassination and that an explosive device was planted on the vehicle inside the MINUSMA camp during the actual meeting. In the same context, AQIM’s al-Mourabitoune Brigade also weighed in by releasing an eulogy letter or statement of condolences on the death of Cheikh Ag Aoussa “signed” by Khalid Abu al-‘Abbas, more commonly known as Mokhtar Belmokhtar. The main point in the statement except for paying tribute to Cheikh Ag Aoussa was to take the oppurtunity to undermine the Barkhane mission by blaming France for the alleged targeted assassination, additionally, mentioning the French airstrike that killed CMA fighters in Tinzawatène.

Already the day after the serious developments of October 8, an IED detonation struck a Barkhane convoy in Abeïbara, resulting in several wounded who reportedly were taken to the Amachach base hospital. Mali has already seen a notable uptick of attacks and armed confrontations, and as shown, the Tazalite attack in Niger has had serious ramifications in northern Mali escalating the conflict between all parties involved even further with much more to be expected.

The post Mali: Serious ramifications of the Tazalite attack in the North appeared first on MENASTREAM.

Approximate location of the attack

On the evening of October 10, around 20h00 local time, a suicide bomber targeted a Swedish MINUSMA patrol in the town of Timbuktu. While the patrol were conducting a routine mission an unidentified man approached the patrol and detonated an explosive device attached to his body, probably a suicide belt, although the visible damages on the perpetrator’s body is limited. The assailant died in the attack without causing any injuries within the ranks of the Swedish unit, according to statement by the Swedish Armed Forces. Local sources reported that a loud explosion was heard in Timbuktu and that the attacker died behind the General Hospital of Timbuktu in front of headquarters of the NGO Ardil.

Additional reports indicated that the attacker had associates who may have infiltrated the town together with the former and that those still were at large sought by security forces, these reports are still not confirmed.

Photo of the suicide bomber

Last time a suicide attack occured in Mali was in Gao on May 31 this year, with almost simultaneous attacks targeting the MINUSMA camp and the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS). The attack against the camp was carried out by detonation of an SVBIED that resulted in one Chinese peacekeeper killed and two others severely injured, while the other attack was carried out by “inghimasiyyin” (commandos fighting to the death) targeting a hotel hosting UNMAS experts, three contractors were killed in the attack, two being Malian private security officers and one a French UNMAS expert. AQIM’s al-Mourabitoune Brigade claimed responsibility for the attacks.

On February 12 an SVBIED attack targeted the MINUSMA camp in Kidal, this was a complex attack with mortar shells targeting the base to divert the peacekeepers while the vehicle forced the gate open and continued into the camp’s interior to detonate the SVBIED which left seven peacekeepers dead and more than 30 wounded.

The post Mali: Suicide attack targeted Swedish peacekeepers in Timbuktu appeared first on MENASTREAM.

Security-related incidents and key developments

October has been a violent month in northern and central Mali on a similar level as previous month, although there was a notable increase in more complex attacks, with attacks and activity recorded in zones pertaining to AQIM, Ansar Dine and MUJAO or in respective group’s main area of operations. Most of the attacks were carried out by Ansar Dine including multiple rocket/mortar attacks that targeted several bases of United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission In Mali (MINUSMA) and several attacks targeting Barkhane forces by detonations of IEDs/landmines, the majority in the area of Abeïbara. A complex attack was conducted against the Malian army in Goma-Coura, and also an attempted suicide attack in Timbuktu which targeted a Swedish MINUSMA patrol.

An incident that have come to mark this month was the death of Cheikh Ag Aoussa in Kidal, HCUA’s military commander killed in a car explosion after leaving a biweekly security meeting between representatives from CMA, MINUSMA and Barkhane, unclear circumstances regarding the killing of Ag Aoussa have made locals to believe that France was behind his death, further complicating the French Barkhane mission, which already is strongly opposed by people in the Kidal region. The conflict in Mali has increasingly produced spillover in the neighbouring countries of Niger and Burkina with incidents highlighted in this report, an ongoing turf war along both ethnic lines and between competing networks in Mali and across its borders.

The precarious security situation in northern Mali is accompanied by a just as bad political situation, characterized by division and discord. The installation of the ‘interim authorities’ continues to face obstacles, CMA on one hand accused the government of taking unilateral desicions by signing a decree appointing members for the interim authorities, hence increasing the number of government members for the Transitional Council in contravention with the agreed framework. Additionally, factions within CMA, namely MSA, CPA, CMFPR2, and a part of MNLA were not pleased with the list of appointees, thus, the lists weren’t inclusive, also accusing the Minister of Territorial Administration Mohamed Ag Erlaf of favoring CMA officials in Kidal, and likewise that the CMA officials in Kidal only work in favor of the Kidal Region. CMA’s reaction to the discontent was to reaffirm that only HCUA, MNLA and MAA were part of CMA, and the only factions that could speak in CMA’s name with reference to its establisment which only included those factions just mentioned, thus dismissing the discontent expressed by representatives from the former mentioned movements except MNLA which is part of CMA, and MSA being a recent splinter group led by Moussa Ag Acharatoumane, also one of the founders of MNLA. CMA emphazised that CPA and CMFPR2 were brought on board as a “friendly gesture” after they were rejected by Bamako and the Platform. The groups rejected made their move by stating that they constituted the majority of the “refounded” CMA, a move that could be understood as the creation of a ‘CMA2’. A lot of confusing acronyms reflecting the state of politics in northern Mali, characterized by perplexity and lack of progress.

The tribe Kel Antessar and allies and the Superior Council of Imghad and allies signed a solidarity charter on October 25 in Bamako, agreeing to to cooperate on the political-, security- and humanitarian level, with the stated aim to address and review issues in the interest of both communities.

HCUA’s (High Council for the Unity of Azawad) Superior Council of Defense officially designated Achafghi Ag Bouhada as the new Chief of Staff succeeding recently deceased Cheikh Ag Aoussa, and also named Alhousseini AG Ahmedou as Deputy Chief of Staff, the decision was made during a meeting on October 25 in Intikawa, although accumulating reports revealed Bouhada as Aoussa’s successor almost a week earlier.

A positive development in Northern Mali was the beginning of joint patrols that started in early October along the Ménaka-Ansongo axis followed by Gao and Kidal with various constellations of MINUSMA-, Barkhane-, Malian (FAMa)-, Plateforme- and CMA forces.

An important development with effects still to be seen is the alleged agreed ceasefire by Ansar Dine’s leader Iyad Ag Ghaly on the request by the President of the High Islamic Council Mahmoud Dicko. It is said that Dicko negotiated with the approval of Malian authoritities and he reportedly confirmed that a letter said to be signed by Ag Ghaly was authentic,

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circulating on Malian media delivered by mediators of Dicko and Ag Ghaly. Despite that the letter by Ag Ghaly allegedly is authentic, one should be sceptical and cautious about the realisation of a ceasefire, and above all the stance of France and its Barkhane mission. After the finalization of this report Ansar Dine’s media wing Rimaah issued a statement refuting the claims made by Mahmoud Dicko. According to the statement the group had neither agreed to any unilateral ceasefire nor cessation of hostilities with what was referred to as the “apostate and treacherous” government in Bamako.

After more than 17 months since the initial pledge of allegiance, Islamic State’s Amaq News Agency finally recognized in a statement the former MUJAO spokesman Adnan Abu Walid al-Sahrawi’s faction of al-Murabitin as part of the Islamic State. The statement was followed by a short high quality video showing al-Sahrawi reading the pledge of allegiance accompanied by his men numbering around thirty fighters. Whether or not the initial pledge of allegiance was made back in May 2015 is today of less importance, al-Sahrawi and his men have had time to consolidate and set up a base in its sanctuary of the southern Gao region, and also other preparations and planning for what was coming. Within a short period of time the group has conducted three operations for which it has claimed responsibility, not excluding the possibility of additional attacks not taken credit for. With the setbacks ISIS has experienced in Libya, but also in Iraq and Syria, it is possible that both returnees from especially North and West Africa see Sahrawi’s group as an alternative. The tri-state border area where Sahrawi and his men are active also constitute a strategic location with ISWAP/Boko Haram’s arena in the south around Lake Chad, and ISIS Libya’s crumbling Wilayat Tarabulus in the north. The official recognition by ISIS of Sahrawi’s gang could turn the group into a potential recruiting magnet being based on the fertile ground for jihadists that Mali provides together with the border zones in neighbouring countries that lack adequate military presence. It is difficult to forecast how Sahrawi’s project will develop but considering the potential of North Africans, Sahelians and Westafricans joining his ranks, it could further destabilize an already torn region and provide fallback for jihadists pushed back and pressured in other areas of the region. Additionally, the accession of Sahrawi’s al-Murabitin to the Islamic State could brutalize the Malian arena with demands of spectacular and macabre attacks.

Amaq statement recognizing al-Sahrawi’s faction of al-Murabitin joining the Islamic State

Screencaps from the Amaq video

The news of al-Sahrawi and his faction of al-Murabitin joining the ‘Islamic State was also featured with pledge of allegiance and basic facts summarized in the 53^th edition of ISIS weekly bulletin al-Naba.

The al-Naba news item concerning al-Sahrawi and his faction of al-Murabitin

 

AQIM’s Al-Andalus Media released a video on October 31 with proof of life of the Romanian hostage Iulian Ghergut, abducted by al-Mourabitoun on April 4, 2015 in Tambao, Burkina Faso. In the short high quality video Ghergut greets his family and says that he is in good health although looking tired and aged after 19 months in captivity, he also calls on the Romanian government to do everything in their power to secure his release.

Screencap from the video with Romanian hostage Iulian Ghergut

 

Incident type and actors:
¹ violent extremist organizations, Islamist militants, Jihadist groups, terrorism
² inter-armed group violence (non-Jihadist)                                               
³ banditry, robberies, organized crime                                               
⁴ military -and counter-terrorism operations by Barkhane-, MINUSMA-, Malian (FAMa)-, Nigerien-, Burkinabé- or Algerian security forces                                               
⁵ Other

Mali

October 3
– A complex attack targeted the MINUSMA base in Aguelhok, Kidal, with attack initiated around 14h, it involved a serie of mortar shells fired at the base and IED detonations that struck vehicles deployed to find the mortar launchsite. The attack resulted in the death of 2 peacekeepers and another 7 wounded. Ansar Dine claimed responsibility for the attack.¹

Statement on the attack in Aguelhok by Ansar Dine’s media wing Rimaah Media Foundation

October 4 

– A GTIA Elou escort of the Malian army was ambushed between Acharane and Tintelout, 1 soldier was killed and another wounded in the attack carried out by unidentified gunmen aboard vehicles heavily armed, the prefect of Goundam Ibrahim Ag Achabane was also injured, the attackers reportedly seized two vehicles also burned the vehicle of the prefecture.¹

– Late at night, fighters from CM-FPR attacked a CMA checkpoint in M’bouna, CMA sources claimed that the attackers were ‘neutralized’.²

Ansar Dine’s claim of responsibility for the IED detonation

– Mortar shells targeted the MINUSMA camp in Ber, but landed approximately 100m outside the camp without causing any damages.¹

October 8

– Early in the morning, French Barkhane forces conducted a counter-terrorism operation in the area of Tinzawatène, an airstrike was also reported that hit a vehicle carrying a fighter associated with CMA who was killed in the strike, 2 others killed were later found buried by locals, several arrests were also carried out amidst the operation.^4,2

Mossa Ag Abdi, one of those killed in operation (Tinzawatène)

Vehicle destroyed in the operation (Tinzawatène)

– In the morning unidentified gunmen aboard vehicles attacked the villages of Sahène and Tinasben, attacking locals burning and also seizing vehicles, the attack reportedly left 3 dead, multiple wounded and as many as 17 people abducted.^1,2

– The military commander of HCUA, Cheikh Ag Aoussa was killed in a car explosion around 18h00 after leaving a biweekly security meeting at the MINUSMA base in Kidal. It is still not clear if his vehicle was struck by an IED/mine or if a bomb was planted on his car.^2,1,4 [See MENASTREAM report Mali: Serious ramifications of the Tazalite attack in the North]

Cheikh Ag Aoussa’s car after being destroyed in the explosion, in the background the MINUSMA base

October 9
– Ansar Dine claimed to have detonated 2 mines/IEDs on 2 French Barkhane vehicles near the village of Abeïbara, Barkhane acknowledged that 6 of their soldiers were injured in the blasts.¹

Ansar Dine claim of responsibility

October 10
– Around 20h00, a suicide attack targeted Swedish peacekeepers on patrol in Timbuktu. The attacker approached the unit and detonated his explosive belt which only partially exploded due to some kind of malfunction, only killing the assailant with no injuries within the ranks of the Swedish MINUSMA unit.^1,4 [See MENASTREAM report Mali: Suicide attack targeted Swedish peacekeepers in Timbuktu]

Photo of the assailant killed after detonating his explosive belt

– 1 dead and 1 injured after two 16 year old youths picked up an explosive device while walking in the bush in the area of Gao.⁵

October 11

– Chief of the tribe Kel Ansar Habadi Ag Mohamed was abducted by gunmen aboard two vehicles on the evening at the market of Zouara, AQIM intially suspected. Habadi was later released.^1,2

– Fatal accident in Dienngo involving youths who picked up a grenade/IED, 1 killed and 1 severly injured.⁵

October 12
– Around 17h unidentified gunmen aboard motorcycles opened fire on the Malian Gendarmerie checkpoint in Matomo, the gendarmes stationed at the site fled with the assailants burning the post, a motorcycle and other material left behind.¹

October 13 
– A complex attack targeted the Malian army in Goma-Coura, initiated with IEDs followed by armed attack, reportedly including RPGs, leaving 4 Malian soldiers dead and 7 wounded, Ansar Dine claimed responsibility for the attack attributing the ambush to the Macina Brigade.¹

Infographic and detailed description of the attack in Goma-Coura by Ansar Dine’s Rimaah Media Foundation

– Ansar Dine claimed to have detonated an IED on a Barkhane vehicle, part of convoy on search patrol in Ti-n-Demba, 24km east of the Amachach base, this according to statement by Ansar Dine’s media wing Rimaah.¹

Ansar Dine statement on the claimed detonation in Ti-n-Demba

– Man who worked as guide for the Malian army during Operation Seno identified as Thédore Somboro, assassinated around 18h between Ségué & Djinajo, Bankass Cercle.¹

The victim of the assassination in Bankass, Théodore Somboro

– Around 17h00 in Inlamawane, unidentified gunmen assassinated CMA responsable for the Marsi area identified as Dahmane Ag Alhader.²

Dahmane Ag Alhader

– A medical vehicle delivering vaccines was struck by an IED around 17h00, approximately 7km from the Gossi checkpoint on the road linking Gossi and Hombori. A nurse was killed in the blast.¹

– A Malian army vehicle was struck by an IED around 16h00 in the area of Téméra resulting in 2 wounded soldiers.¹

---

October 19

– Two gunmen aboard a motorcycle failed in an attempt to seize a car in the Abaradjou district of Timbuktu, as the driver refused to hand over the keys the gunmen shot him in the arm.³

The vehicle the gunmen attempted to seize

AQIM/al-Mourabitoun statement claiming responsibility for the attack in Ansongo

Ansar Dine statement

October 27
A man who just had made a withdrawal at the Ecobank was robbed and shot in the leg by gunmen around 13h in Bamako.³

Man shot and robbed on the parking of Ecobank in Bamako

October 28
Gunmen attacked a transport bus in Bouaré. A witness said the occupants were stripped of their assets. No loss of lives was reported.³

October 30
Mortar shells were fired around 17h30 at the joint MINUSMA-Barkhane base in Kidal. 6-8 shells landed around the helipad and damaged two Banghladeshi helicopters.¹

One of the damaged helicopters following the mortar/rocket attack

Ansar Dine claim of responsibility for the attack

October 31
Rumors that a Barkhane vehicle was hit by an IED near Abeïbara in the morning. Ansar Dine later claimed to have destroyed a French Barkhane armored vehicle by detonation of a mine in the area.¹

Ansar Dine claim on destroying a French Barkhane vehicle near Abeïbara

Niger

October 6
– Unidentified gunmen arriving on board vehicles and motorcycles attacked soldiers, gendarmes and guards assigned with protecting the Tazalite refugee camp around 14h. The attack left 22 dead and 5 injured. A soldier who survived the attack said that the assailants were MUJAO jihadists.¹

October 14
– Around 21h00 unidentified gunmen abducted a US aid worker associated with the local NGO JEMED & YWAM, the bodyguard and a National Guard were killed in the incident.^1,3

October 17
– Around 4h30 the prison of Koutoukalé was attacked by jihadists, Nigerien security forces managed to repell the attack with two wounded within their ranks and one of the assailants equipped with an explosive belt killed. Adnan Abu Walid al-Sahrawi’s Islamic State in the Greater Sahara claimed responsibility for the failed attack according to the Mauritanian newsoutlet Alakhbar with reference to a received phone call.¹

Jihadist with explosive belt killed in the Koutoukalé prison attack

– Violent clashes reported between Tuareg and Tebu armed men in Tchibarakaten, Agadez Region. Amoumoune Kalakouwa, a Tuareg ex-rebel and former MNJ military leader was said to be involved in the clashes. A local source in Agadez told MENASTREAM that several clashes had taken place, but also added that Kalakouwa’s involvement was nothing more than rumours not to be verified by any reliable sources.²

October 26
– Two civilians were wounded by gunfire when a military patrol opened fire on a man fleeing his vehicle. He was stopped earlier for transporting migrants and ordered to take them to the IOM migrant center.⁵

October 29
Assassination attempt in the against the former rebel and MNJ military leader Amoumoune Kalakouwa, he survived only lightly injured. The assassination attempt took place in the Telwa valley area near Agadez. Kalakouwa is now within the ranks of the Nigerien forces and security advisor for the Prime Minister Brigi Rafini. It was later reported that the suspected assailants had been arrested in an area southwest of Agadez.²

Amoumoune Kalakouwa

Burkina Faso

October 12
– Early in the morning around 5h00, unidentified gunmen heavily armed attacked a Burkinabé army post in Intagom, 4 soldiers and 2 locals were killed in the attack, the attackers took control of the post and also attacked Burkinabé reinforcements, the assailants seized a technical and weapons before leaving. Adnan Abu Walid al-Sahrawi’s Islamic state of Greater Sahara (ex-MUJAO) claimed responsibility for the attack according to the Mauritanian newsoutlet Alakhbar.¹

October 18
– Unidentified gunmen attacked the locality of Kerboulé around 16h00, the gunmen clashed with the local self-defense group Koglweogo, and killed at least 4 people including 3 miners and 1 Koglweogo.^1,2

October 23
– A terrorist suspect who managed to escape a raid by security forces in Kilwin was shot dead in following shootout around 2h in the area of Pasani, another 3 individuals are sought in connection to the events with 6 arrested earlier including 2 men and 4 women.^1,4

The alleged terrorist recuiter killed in the shootout

Algeria

October 25-26
– Algerian security forces opened fire on vehicles attempting to cross into Mali, a young man was killed by the gunfire, an incident that sparked tensions and protests for at least two days in the predominatly Tuareg border village of Tinzaouaten. Algerian security forces reportedly opened fire on the protesters, injuring a young man and a girl. A Tuareg activist on published photos on social media of an empty shell found at the site.⁴

Photos from the protests and the empty shell

Incident map showing locations of security-related incidents in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso for October, 2016

The post MENASTREAM – Sahel Report for October 2016 appeared first on MENASTREAM.

AQIM’s Al-Andalus Media released a 22m31sec high quality video focusing on spies, or as described ‘traitors’, locals providing intelligence to French (Barkhane)-, Malian-, Mauritanian- and MINUSMA forces. A previous video on the subject was released on December 7, 2015 entitled ‘Traitors’, thus making this release the “sequel”.

The video begins with a Qur’an recitation of two verses from Surah an-Nisa’ (4:138-139)
Give tidings to the hypocrites that there is for them a painful punishment – Those who take disbelievers as allies instead of the believers. Do they seek with them honor [through power]? But indeed, honor belongs to Allah entirely.

The first captive presented, named Mohamed Ould Boihy gave a detailed account on how he was approached by a commander called “Guillame” and his translator “Redouane” during Operation Serval, how he started working for the French -and Malian intelligence   and how he recruited informers in favor of the French forces, hence building a network of spies in Timbuktu and surroundings.

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Mohamed Ould Boihy

Abu Abd al-Rahman al-Sanhaji and Housseyne Ould Badi

The assassination operation of the National Guard officer Bachir Ould Afad on September 26 in the Abaradjou neighbourhood of Timbuktu is also featured in the video, together with the execution of local MLNA spokesman Efad Ag Arifek abducted on June 6 in Ber, east of Timbuktu. In the sequence with Ag Arifek, the commander of Katibat al-Furqan Talha al-Libi is standing beside.

Bachir Ould Afad

Efad Ag Arifek and Talha al-Libi

Daou Ould H’med

The video ends by showing Daou Ould H’med a 34 year-old recruited by Mauritanian intelligence in a refugee camp in Mauritania. He was according to what was portrayed in the video forgiven, since he turned himself in together with the performance of ‘tawba’, the act of repentance.

The video’s main aim is to deter locals from collaborating with military forces opposing the “Mujahideen”, a local population that constitutes a crucial component for the jihadist project in Northern Mali, or what is referred to as Azawad. A local population that AQIM is highly dependent on, and with which it has built connections since the beginning of the 21th century, a relationship it has managed to maintain. AQIM attempts to balance between rewards and punishments in accordance with Shariah law, and also portrays itself as a fair judge laying emphasis on the “careless” acts of the captives, who prioritized material wealth in disfavor of “morals and loyalty to their people”.

The post Mali: New video release by AQIM’s Al-Andalus Media – ‘Traitors 2’ appeared first on MENASTREAM.

“Mastermind” of Grand-Bassam shootings

On January 11, RFI reported that one of the commanders who directed the Grand-Bassam attack in Ivory Coast on March 13, 2016 had been arrested near Gossi, in the region of Gao between January 9 and 10 by French Barkhane forces. In the report is the concerned individual named as ‘Mimi Ould Baba Ould El Mokhtar’, as noted has the name stirred some confusion making some to believe that the person arrested is Mini Ould Baba Ould Sidi Al Mokhtar, who is the tribal chief of Arab Kountas. RFI corrected the name in a report on January 12 by stating that the name of the individual arrested is Mimi Ould Baba Ould Cheikh “presumed brain” behind the Grand-Bassam attack, tracked by the Malian secret service after returning from a stay in Algeria and arrested in coordination with French Barkhane forces who have Ould Cheikh in their custody.

A heritage: from drug-trafficking to jihadism

Mimi Ould Baba Ould Cheikh is no one less than the son of the infamous drug trafficker Baba Ould Cheikh, strongly associated with MUJAO. Baba Ould Cheikh is also the mayor of Tarkint, originating from the small village of Tangara near Tabankort. Ould Cheikh the older is attributed a prominent role in the drugtrafficking network of Gao, a network sometimes referred to as the “Mali Connection”, arrested for his supposed involvement in the”Air Cocaine” case. Baba Ould Cheikh has also acted as a mediator for the liberation of hostages abducted by jihadists. Just like his father, Mimi seems to have taken a prominent role in the regional trafficking and jihadist networks, an inherited position benefiting from his fathers contacts and kinship. It is very possible that Ould Cheikh the younger was behind the Grand-Bassam attack, but also the previous attack that overnight struck Splendid Hotel and restaurant Cappuccino in central Ouagadougou on January 15-16, 2016. According to local sources is Mimi’s involvement in the serie of attacks that struck West Africa in early 2016 something that is “generally known”, and especially in Gao. A question that remains unanswered is what brought Mimi to Gossi following his alleged visit to Algeria? A fateful journey that eventually led to his arrest.

Infamous drug trafficker Baba Ould Cheick and the father of Mimi arrested near Gossi

Left to right: Iyad Ag Ghaly, Baba Ould Cheikh, Mohamed Ag Mahmoud and El Hadj Ag Gamou

The post Mali: Presumed AQIM commander of Grand-Bassam attack arrested near Gossi appeared first on MENASTREAM.

Three recently published videos announced the formation of a new Fulani armed group active in the areas of Ansongo, Fafa and Haïre. The group is described as non-jihadist and non-separatist, thus recognizing the Malian state and does not claim any territory. It has a secular outlook and Fulani in its composition. The nascent self-defense group has not presented any name yet, although they put a red, green and white flag on display, an emblem clearly distinguishing them from jihadists. A few dozen of the group’s fighters are shown in the videos released.

There are several reasons believed to be behind the creation of this group. Firstly, the dissolution of the National Alliance for the Protection of Fulani Identity and the Restoration of Justice (ANSIPRJ), with remains of this alliance scattered in central and northern Mali. Secondly, the limited influence of certain groups in the political process, with a former Ganda Izo commander, Abderrahmane Cissé presented as the leading figure of this new formation. Another leading member is an ex-GATIA named Obel Brehima. Thirdly, the abuses the Fulani community suffers from both Malian security forces and armed groups. Lastly, pressure from jihadists in the area.

Hence, the group aims to gather smaller groups active on the ground in areas where it has presence with the objective to protect the Fulani community from harrassment. They also called on the Fulani community to support them materially and financially, and further stated that they were prepared to “fight to the end”.

(below photos and full video clips showing the new group and its members)
 

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On Thursday April 13, 2017, a pro-AQIM account on telegram and a pro-ISIS account on twitter respectively reported that a Burkinabe jihadist group possibly would pledge allegiance (bay’ah) to the Islamic State, the group was not mentioned by name, although it is believed that the reports (considered rumors) refered to Ansaroul Islam led by Boureïma Dicko, more commonly known as Malam Ibrahim Dicko. It is worth noting that the AQIM associated account most likely cited the pro-ISIS account. Dicko’s group, being the main source of a surge in insecurity in Burkina’s north, stemming from targeted killings, assassination attempts, village and school incursions and complex attacks against army or police positions. A security situation that have paralyzed the educational sector, impacted access to health and social services, also resulting in displacements and affecting food security in Burkina Faso’s Sahel Region.

Members of the jihadist group Ansaroul Islam

The aforementioned rumors emerge in the wake of the recent tri-partite cross-border operation named ‘Panga’ involving French Barkhane, Malian and Burkinabe forces. The Fhero forest located along the Mali-Burkina Faso border constituted the focal point of the operations, and also the site of a double-attack which targeted French forces in the afternoon of April 5. The double-attack was initiated by an IED detonation that struck a light armored vehicle (LAV), wounding two soldiers, and ensued by an ambush that targeted an engineering unit that arrived to secure the perimeter of the first attack, leaving one French soldier dead. Jama’at Nusrat ul-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) claimed responsibility for the attacks. On April 7, residents in villages inside the Fhero forest and surroundings confirmed several airstrikes and shellings throughout the day, the following day things had calmed down, marking the last day of the operations.

The Fhero forest recently gained increased attention for harboring Dicko and his men, active between Djibo and Mondoro, notwithstanding the historical presence of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Al-Murabitoun, Ansar Dine and MUJAO. At present, there are five more distinct local groups active in the area, one based in the surroundings of Sèrma. Another group of smaller AQIM units in the Dogon country, more specifically in the area of Dinangourou and Dioungani-Peulh. Malam’s group along the border, remnants of MUJAO fighters, most prominently under the leadership of al-Sahrawi in the tri-state border area, and Al-Murabitoun, on the local level active along the axes Ansongo-Gao-Gossi. Hence, the claim of responsibility for the attack against French forces does not automatically confirm that Ansaroul Islam has joined the recent merger of AQIM-affiliated factions in the region, nevertheless an important sign.

Regarding the foregoing rumors, firstly, it is important to note that Dicko reportedly a former MUJAO member has a connection to Adnan Abu Walid Al-Sahrawi, although the nature of this relation at present is not known. Secondly, well-informed sources confirm that Ansaroul Islam have expressed their intention to join the Islamic State, the previously referenced pro-ISIS source confidently confirmed the report to MENASTREAM while citing Libyan ISIS fighters, the original source of the rumor about a forthcoming bay’ah in Burkina Faso. Despite being dislodged from its former stronghold in Sirte and scattered across Libya, the network is there with a significant media presence and seemingly a not inconsiderable role regarding communications between West Africa and Raqqa.

A source refering to a Burkinabe security source working close to the “Ansaroul Islam folder” also indicated the group’s affiliation with the “Islamic State in the Sahel”, that is to say Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS). Dicko and Sahrawi share an operational space in Burkina’s north, whereas Dicko’s group pertains to the Soum Province while Sahrawi’s gang more to the Oudalan Province. Sahrawi has claimed responsibility for two attacks on Burkinabe soil. On September 1 last year, Sahrawi’s group attacked a customs post in Markoye, and on October 12 an army position in Intagom, also the first attacks materializing since Sahrawi gave his oath to al-Baghdadi in May 2015.

Moreover, the Mauritanian news outlet Al-Akhbar reported that Dicko’s group, in the article refered to as “Ançar Allah” intended to give an oath of allegiance to the Islamic State, although stating that it was unclear if the oath was to be given directly to Al-Baghdadi or to (as stated) the “Islamic State in West Africa” led by al-Sahrawi, citing the outlet’s sources. However, an official communication with an oath of allegiance emanating from Burkina is still to be seen.

Recently, an important meeting took place in Indaki, Mali, near the tri-state border. During this meeting fighters from Dicko’s Ansaroul Islam met up with a group of jihadists in the area, Almansour Ag Alkassoum, an Imghad Tuareg in his mid-forties is the commander and brain of this group, he was also present at this meeting together with an unnamed individual who had lived at the Mentao refugee camp in Burkina Faso. Alkassoum has the role of a coordinator among the sarayas (units) active in the Gourma and the Haïre. Alkassoum originates from the village of Madiakoye, the administrative center of the commune Séréré, located just south of the Niger River about seventy kilometers east of Timbuktu. He operates with some other Tuaregs from the Imouchag tribe, Bellahs from the Gourma, Fulanis from Séno Mango, and Bambaras from the Dawa movement coming from Bamako. Together the units operating in the area constitute the Ansar Dine katiba (brigade) refered to as Ansar Dine Sud or “South of the River” (not to be confused with Katiba Macina). Alkassoum’s katiba has been responsable for multiple attacks against Malian and MINUSMA forces in the area, stretching from Gourma-Rharous in the north to Douentza in the south.

It is strongly assumed that the meeting between Dicko’s men and the group led by Alkassoum focused on Ansaroul Islam uniting with JNIM. Noteworthy, is that the area of Indaki, more precisely Tin Téhégrin saw clashes between a tri-partite patrol and presumed jihadists as late as April 7, no details or outcome of the clashes have been reported.

A question remaining is whether the relationship between Ansaroul Islam and JNIM might have changed following the recent events in the border area. The outcome of the tri-partite military operations as reported by the French Ministry of Defense, “..materiel seized, two terrorists neutralized, eight others captured and several dozens of suspects handed over to the Burkinabe authorities.” Meanwhile, Nord Sud Journal reported that more than two hundred suspects were arrested in the Fhero forest and surrounding villages, at the same time villagers witnessed a still visible presence of jihadists in the area, specifically in Douna, now when the sweeping operations in the area have ended. Until now, no substantial evidence points at Ansaroul Islam joining the Islamic State, notwithstanding the various sources from where these rumors and speculations have emerged.

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Leading figures gathered for the announcement of the merger into Jama’at Nusrat ul-Islam wal-Muslimin (screen capture from the video released by al-Zaleqa Foundation for Media Productions)

By Héni Nsaibia

In the midst of a faltering peace process in Mali that are characterized by quarrels and cleavages between the Malian government and signatory armed groups, they are increasingly fragmented along ethno-political lines. In contrast, jihadist groups at the core of a regional insurgency display a united front by merging and renewing their oath of allegiance to Al-Qaeda and its leader Aymen Al-Zawahiri, a move that possibly could fuel Islamist militancy in Mali and across the porous borders of neighboring countries.

From rebellion hijacked by Islamists to French intervention and the world’s most dangerous peacekeeping mission

In early 2012, a Tuareg-led rebellion against the Malian government in Bamako swept the north of the country with the aim to seek and achieve independence for a marginalized region largely inhabited by Tuaregs and Arabs. The rebellion was later hijacked by Islamists and consequently catalyzed a military intervention by France and the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping mission (MINUSMA) – considered the world’s deadliest – in order to stabilize the country. Despite these deployments, the deeply-rooted insurgency shows no signs of being defeated.

Jihadist leaders reunite for a watershed moment

On March 2, a video was released showing the gathering of five leading figures of several jihadist factions in the Sahara-Sahel region. The video constituted the founding statement of a “new group” bringing together the Islamist extremist Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb‘s (AQIM) Sahara Region, Al-Murabitoun, Ansar Dine, and the Macina Liberation Front (Katiba Macina) movements. Each of the factions were represented by militant commanders who have gained notoriety for spearheading jihadist militancy across the Sahel. Al-Qaeda’s North African franchise AQIM was represented by the Emir of its Sahara Branch, namely Djamel Okacha (Yahya Abu al-Hammam) and Abu ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Sanhaji who is responsible for the movement’s judicial affairs. Al-Murabitoun who have conducted several high-profile terrorist attacks across North and West Africa, led by the infamous militant commander Mokhtar Belmokhtar whose whereabouts and fate remains unknown, was represented by the group’s deputy commander Mohamed Ould Nouini (al-Hassan al-Ansari). Ansar Dine, Al-Qaeda’s (AQ) mainly Tuareg local affiliate was represented by its Emir Iyad Ag Ghaly (Abu al-Fadhl). Lastly, the Macina Liberation Front, a mainly Fulani Islamist group part of Ansar Dine and active in central Mali, represented by its Emir Mohamed Koufa. Together, the militant leaders proclaimed the watershed announcement of a united group, which has assumed the moniker of “Jama’at Nusrat ul-Islam wal-Muslimeen” translated as “Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims” (JNIM).

Anything more than just a structural reorganization?

Despite publicising the alliance and the founding of this new group, it is important to note that the aforementioned factions already enjoyed close operational linkages on the battlefield, which has drawn attention to both the timing and purpose of the merger. So where lies the strategic importance in the formalization of an already existing nucleus? The first explanation for the announcement may be to debunk unsubstantiated media speculation about splits in the ranks of the jihadists, or that al-Qaeda’s Sahel based affiliate groups were seeking to switch allegiance to the Islamic State (ISIS). Secondly, the designation of Iyad Ag Ghaly as the Emir of this alliance further highlights the importance of ethno-political dynamics that are fueling Al-Qaeda’s ascendency in the Sahel. Ag Ghaly’s influence in the mountainous region of Adrar des Ifoghas has been important for AQIM’s implantation in the region where the nobleman and long-serving militant commander has used his wide-reaching familial linkages, and the Islamisization of Tuareg separatism, to secure a steady stream of recruits for his political and religious aspirations. Thirdly, it gives an injection to invigorate the insurgency in the Sahel and also puts a stronger imprint on the region within the global map of jihad.

Since the formation of Ag Ghaly’s Ansar Dine in 2012, the movement has shared a mutually beneficial relationship with AQIM. Following France’s Operation Serval military intervention in Mali, several AQIM cells were reportedly rendered defunct by broad based counterterrorism operations; those that remained were reported to have been provided sanctuary by Ansar Dine. In Mali’s northernmost Kidal administrative division, AQIM had three active katibas or brigades, Al-Ansar, Youssef Ibn Tachfin, and Tariq Ibn Ziyad, which is believed to have been entirely assimilated into the Ansar Dine network. Evidence of this lies in the fact that the region in which these factions operated in – saw militancy which was almost exclusively claimed by Ansar Dine for the past three years, the result of a transient phase beginning with the French intervention, and the subsequent elimination of commanders and decimation of the AQIM brigades active in the area. The restructuring of the weakened AQIM factions, and their assimilation into more powerful groups amid intensive counterterrorism operations, may also explain the dynamics that precipitated the formation of Jama’at Nusrat ul-Islam wal-Muslimeen under the unifying Quranic slogan of  “One banner, one group, one emir”.

“And hold firmly to the rope of Allah all together and do not become divided” (Surah Al-‘Imran 3:103)

The message of unity is also articulated with reference to al-Sham – namely the Levant Region of the Middle East – and the alliances created by the formation of the region’s Al-Qaeda proxies of Jabhat Fatah al-Sham and Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, this despite the articulated intention to “cut ties” with Al-Qaeda by the creation of these alliances. Symbolically, Iyad Ag Ghaly also pays tribute to a long list of deceased al-Qaeda ideologues and commanders. In this regard, there is a strong pro-AQ message, thus cementing its ties with the parent organization Al-Qaeda. Although, there are exceptions, Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi and Abu ‘Anas al-Shami both emblematic figures within Al-Qaeda in Iraq, at the same time, precursors who laid the foundation for what was to become the Islamic State. Both held in high esteem by ISIS followers and frequently paid tribute. Al-Shami being the mentor of Taha Falaha more commonly known as Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, the most prominent Islamic State commander. Falaha pledged allegiance to al-Zarqawi back in 2002. As an heir of al-Shami’s and al-Zarqawi’s legacy, their violent doctrine and entrusted by al-Zarqawi, Falaha rose to the top in the Islamic State organization. Falaha was killed in a US airstrike near al-Bab in northern Syria on August 30, 2016. Hence, a subtle indication that AQIM as part of a wider Al-Qaeda strategy is preparing for a post-Islamic State era by flirting with ISIS followers. Although, not without reservations, Iyad Ag Ghaly empasizes in his speech the importance to avoid extremism (ghulu’) and the priority to adhere to the unity of the Islamic Nation (Ummah), Ag Ghaly also mentions the sensitive issue of takfir (to declare other Muslims, individuals or groups as non-believers), a practice permissive within the sphere of the Islamic State, in contrast a subject and practice which Al-Qaeda ideologues consider to be dealt with by scholars.

Taha Falaha or by his nom de guerre Abu Muhammad al-Adnani (Photo from Islamic State’s al-Naba Newsletter #45)

Further, dispelling any suggestions of factionalism within the wider al-Qaeda body, Ag Ghaly reaffirms allegiance to the Emir of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Abu Mus’ab ‘Abd al-Wadud (Abdelmalek Droukdel), and asserts an oath of fidelity to the General Emir of Al-Qaeda Aymen al-Zawahiri and to the Emir of the Islamic Emirate in Afghanistan, Haibatullah Akhundzada, who al-Zawahiri himself swore allegiance to in June 2016 – adopting the same approach as Usama Bin Laden when he erstwhile pledged loyalty to Mullah Omar. In this regard, we can also draw an interesting parallel to AQIM’s approach in Mali with that of Afghanistan, where Ag Ghaly has adopted the same leadership role as that of Mullah Omar and his successors.

From Sahel as rear base to the main base

Notwithstanding the renewed oath of allegiance to Abdelmalek Droukdel, it is evident that the ability of the AQIM Emir to assert influence in the Sahel has been limited, with the Sahara Region gradually moving from being a rear base and support zone to becoming the main base at the expense of AQIM’s central and historical base in the Atlas Mountains of Algeria, where it has been dismembered by intense counterterrorism operations by the Popular National Army. Highlighting this, in the first two months of 2017, Algerian authorities announced to have killed as many as twenty-four terrorists. On March 17, an audio recording released featuring Droukdel himself, unsurprisingly embraced the consolidation that had taken place and stated that it has set an example for other jihadist groups to follow. Another key point in his speech addressed France, saying that its military activities in the Sahara and the Sahel Region only strengthened fraternity and unity between peoples and tribes, further threatening to move the war to France by stating “until you live the fear our people experience in our lands”.

Al-Qaeda vis-à-vis the Islamic State in the Sahel Region

In addition to the groups comprising the merger, it is important to mention other jihadist actors in order to provide a full picture on the state of affairs within the jihadist scene of the Sahel Region. Adnan Abu Walid al-Sahrawi leads a faction known as the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS). For apparent reasons excluded from the equation of the merger, firstly, because of the split within al-Murabitoun as a result of Adnan Abu Walid al-Sahrawi’s oath of allegiance to the Islamic State in mid-May 2015, with clashes ensuing about a month later near Gao between the followers of Belmokhtar and those of al-Sahrawi, leaving several of al-Sahrawi’s men killed and Sahrawi himself seriously injured. Secondly, Sahrawi is not a major player in the current affairs of the region embroidered with both jihadist and non-jihadist armed groups where Sahrawi’s faction seems to constitute a singular logic in the far east of Mali around the tri-state border area (Liptako), with the groups stronghold located along the Akabar-Andéramboukane axis. Nevertheless, al-Sahrawi’s faction has managed to carry out deadly attacks against security forces in both Niger and Burkina Faso, several of which have resulted in significant casualties. Al-Sahrawi carries the trademark of jihad in its most extreme form with the potential to attract followers from across the region, although without putting too much emphasis on Al-Qaeda / Islamic State competition in this specific context. The limited relevance of the AQ-ISIS schism on the local level was highlighted in January 2016 when AQIM’s Emir of the Sahara Region, Djamel Okacha, gave an interview to the Mauritanian news outlet Al-Akhbar, stating that “…our relationship is normal connecting us to them through relations and contacts”. It was further rumored by sources close to Al-Qaeda in early January, although still not confirmed, that al-Sahrawi had broken his pledge to the Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

Adnan Abu Walid al-Sahrawi reading out pledge of allegiance to the Islamic State and its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (screen capture from video released by Islamic State-affiliated Amaq News Agency)

Another player more recently introduced on the regional jihadist scene is ‘Ansaroul Islam‘ led by the radical Burkinabe preacher Boureïma Dicko more commonly known as Malam Ibrahim Dicko. Dicko reportedly a former MOJWA (Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa) member, detained for two years in Bamako before returning home, gained influence by transmitting his sermons via radio in Djibo and surrounding areas, now leading a fledgling insurgency in Burkina’s northern provinces of Soum and Oudalan. Linked to Ansar Dine’s Katiba Macina, seemingly close to Mohamed Koufa and with former MOJWA fighters in its ranks, the group is still in a premature stage to have a prominent role in the nascent merger. However, such symbiosis may yet occur by solidifying cross-border ties and cooperation between so-called Fulani-dominant extremist groups active in Burkina Faso’s Soum and Oudalan Provinces with others in Mali’s Mopti, Ségou, Sikasso, and Gao Regions.

Leader of Ansaroul Islam, Boureïma Dicko more commonly known as Malam Ibrahim Dicko.

It is necessary to stress that the region’s jihadist groups have far-reaching ramifications in the political economy, including complex ties beyond labels of jihadist groups, and as well to non-jihadist signatory armed groups and criminal networks embedded in both formal and informal structures of the political economy.

The Political and Military context

This announcement also comes in the midst of both significant political and military developments. On the political level, France at the center of counterinsurgency efforts in the Sahel Region is moving towards presidential elections with Francois Hollande leaving office in two months, raising questions about France’s future engagements, this while Germany is strengthening its presence in the region, increased regional military involvement by the US, and Canada still assessing and considering deployment within a framework of peacekeeping and counter-insurgency mission.

The Bamako government and signatory armed groups are in the process of installing the ‘Interim Authorities’ as part of an Algeria-brokered Peace Accord, a conciliatory process from which Mali‘s Islamists were excluded. Now, for the first time, Ansar Dine openly declares allegiance to Al-Qaeda, prior viewed as a disguised front group. Hence the creation of the new group could be viewed as a response to the sidelining of Islamists from the negotiation table and that the initiation of the peace accord has yet to provide full political autonomy to northern Mali under the necessary condition of an Islamic political and judicial system, a scenario unacceptable by both national and international actors. What this video statement also conveys is that in contrast to the signatory armed groups, the jihadists show a unified front represented by individuals of various ethnicities (Tuareg, Fulani, Arab, and Amazigh) and origins who nevertheless share the same objectives. This is in stark contrast to the fragmented signatory armed groups with different loyalties, conflicting interests, and ethno-political ambitions. The installation of the Interim Authorities has yet to be finalized, a part of the Peace Accord that have proven difficult to implement with dissatisfaction and disputes between various factions and actors.

The announcement is besides a political communication, a military one, a renewal of the insurgency, as stated in the speech of unification to close ranks against the “invading crusader enemy”. A development like this carries a significant amounts of public relations capital, hence functioning as a propaganda vehicle for recruitment and attracting support. Secondly, a move like this brings expectations and there is likely a worked out plan to orientate strategically, increase coordination between the different groups, and thus increase the frequency, deadliness, and geographic scope of regional jihadist operations. With the Islamists excluded from the political process it is to be expected that besides attacking MINUSMA peacekeepers, French forces of Operation Barkhane, and Malian forces, efforts will be focused on interrupting and disturbing this process including the targeting of security arrangements like the mixed patrols (MOC – Mécanisme Opérationnel pour la Coordination), signatory armed groups, and individuals viewed as cooperating with international or Malian forces. An attempt to interrupt the aforementioned peace process and security cooperation was projected on January 18 when a suicide bomber dispatched by al-Murabitoun struck the MOC camp in Gao targeting the planned launch of mixed patrols in the area, the attack left more than fifty killed and around hundred twenty wounded; although casualty figures differ depending on sources consulted.

The mere appearance of the aforementioned jihadist leaders carries subliminal messages, assumably calls for mobilization and activation of cells to conduct attacks. In the days that followed the announcement, a MINUSMA base in Aguelhok and a joint base with Barkhane in Tessalit, both located in the Kidal Region were subjected to rocket attacks. A Malian army camp located in Boulikessi, central Mali near the border with Burkina Faso suffered a high-casualty attack with at least 11 soldiers killed on March 5, the first attack claimed by JNIM, only three days after the announcement of the joint venture. In this context, MINUSMA and French Barkhane forces are in the process of strengthening their presence in central Mali, the home turf of Macina Liberation Front leader Mohamed Koufa, a region plagued by both jihadist activity and inter-communal violence. The answer by Malian authorities to address insecurity in the central region was to prohibit the essential movement with motorcycles between villages. Additionally, increasing security crackdowns which discriminately target the Fulani community, too often accompanied with abuses.

The Tillabéri Region of neighboring Niger has also seen an uptick in militancy ascribed to al-Qaeda and ISIS-linked forces. After being subjected to several deadly attacks in the past six months, Niger finally declared a state of emergency in areas bordering Mali and also requested assistance from France, who responded with the decision to deploy a force numbering up to eighty military personnel including special operations forces to the Tillabéri Region in order to aid Niger in fighting terrorists along its borders with Mali.

Neighboring Burkina Faso shows just like Mali and Niger, a negative trend with jihadist activity in the provinces of Soum and Oudalan in the country’s far north. Plagued by increased insecurity as a result of threats, targeted killings, and attacks on security forces, Burkina decided to impose a ban on the use of vehicles at night time in the north, a similar counterterrorism measure as implemented in Mali.

Despite the presence of a nearly 14,000 troop-strong MINUSMA peacekeeping mission force in Mali and 4,000 troops of Operation Barkhane in the region, countries like Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso are failing to respond to the terrorist threat. All three countries share porous borders and common denominators such as widespread corruption, vast areas of underdeveloped and ungoverned space, with limited presence of authorities, including security forces, and structural weaknesses of their intelligence services. Burkina Faso and Niger are major contributors to the MINUSMA peacekeeping mission in Mali, troop deployments abroad which are unfavorable to internal needs, already lacking the resources to secure and manage their own borders and to provide adequate presence of security forces in remote high-risk areas. These deficiencies are being exploited by jihadist groups, from their asymmetric engagements in response to intended counterterrorism efforts, security arrangements, and military operations in the concerned countries previously mentioned. On January 24, the three G5 Sahel countries reaffirmed their commitment to create a joint security force in order to more effectively combat terrorism, although the establishment, efficiency, and results of this commitment are still to be seen.

This article was first published on March 27, 2017 by Aaron Y. Zelin at Jihadology.net [GUEST POST: Jihadist Groups In The Sahel Region Formalize Merger]

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Un compte télégramme proche du groupe AQMI et un compte twitter proche de l’État islamique ont rapporté le 13 avril, qu’un groupe jihadiste burkinabè pourrait prêter allégeance (bay’ah) au soi-disant État islamique (EI). Bien que ce groupe n’ait pas été nommé, des informations (considérées comme rumeurs) font référence au groupe Ansaroul Islam dirigé par Boureïma Dicko, plus connu sous le nom de Malam Ibrahim Dicko. Il est à noter que le compte associé à AQMI a probablement repris le compte pro-EI. Il conviendrait de préciser que le groupe de Dicko constitue la principale source d’insécurité dans le nord du Burkina Faso, où sont observés des tentatives d’assassinat, des assassinats ciblés , des incursions dans les villages et les écoles, ainsi que des attaques complexes contre des positions de l’armée et de la police. Cette situation sécuritaire a paralysé le secteur de l’éducation, impacté sérieusement les services sociaux notamment l’accès au système sanitaire et affecté la sécurité alimentaire, également provoquant un deplacement de la population de certains villages vers la zone frontalière du Soum au Burkina Faso.

Des membres du groupe djihadiste Ansaroul Islam

Les rumeurs susmentionnées ont surgi suite à la récente opération transfrontalière tripartite appelée «Panga», menée conjointement par les forces françaises de Barkhane, les forces Maliennes et les forces Burkinabées. La forêt de Fhero située le long de la frontière Malienne-Burkinabèe, constituait le point focal des opérations, ainsi que le théâtre de la double attaque qui a visé les forces françaises dans l’après-midi du 5 avril. Cette double attaque, revendiquée par Jama’at Nusrat ul-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), été initiée par une détonation d’un engin explosif qui a frappé un véhicule blindé léger (LAV), blessant deux soldats français. S’en est suivie une embuscade qui visait un détachement d’ingénieurs arrivé pour sécuriser le périmètre de la première attaque. Un soldat français y est décédé. Le 7 avril, les habitants des villages de la forêt de Fhero et ses alentours ont confirmé que plusieurs frappes aériennes et bombardements se sont produits tout au long de la journée. Le lendemain, ces actions militaires se sont calmées, marquant le dernier jour des opérations.

La forêt de Fhero a récemment fait l’objet d’une attention particulière pour abriter Dicko et ses hommes, actifs entre Djibo et Mondoro, et ce, malgré la présence historique d’Al-Qaïda au Maghreb islamique, d’Al-Mourabitoune, d’Ansar Dine et du MUJAO. Actuellement, il existe cinq groupes locaux distincts actifs dans la zone, l’un des groupes basé dans les environs de Sèrma, un autre groupe de petites unités d’AQMI dans le pays Dogon, spécifiquement dans les zones de Dinangourou et Dioungani-Peulh, et le groupe de Malam qui occupe le long de la frontière, des résidus du MUJAO, rangés sous la direction d’al-Sahraoui, sont établis dans la zone frontalière tripoint dit Liptako et dans le sud de Ménaka, et enfin, Al-Mourabitoune, qui occupe un local actif le long des axes Ansongo-Gao-Gossi. Cette configuration fait que la revendication de responsabilité pour l’attaque contre les forces françaises ne confirme pas automatiquement qu’Ansaroul Islam a rejoint la fusion récente de factions affiliées à AQMI dans la région, ce qui reste néanmoins un signe important.

Pour revenir aux rumeurs précèdentes, il est important de noter tout d’abord que Dicko serait– comme nous avons informé précédemment – un ancien membre du MUJAO, en lien avec Adnane Abou Walid Al-Sahraoui, bien que la nature de cette relation à l’heure actuelle ne soit pas connue. Deuxièmement, des sources bien informées confirment qu’Ansaroul Islam a exprimé son intention de rejoindre l’EI. La source référencée pro-EI a confirmé avec certitude le rapport à MENASTREAM, tout en citant les combattants libyens d’EI, principale source de la rumeur sur une éventuelle bay’ah au Burkina Faso. Bien qu’il soit délogé de son ancienne forteresse à Syrte et disséminé à travers la Libye, le réseau existe dans cette région avec une importante présence médiatique et apparemment, un rôle non négligeable en ce qui concerne les communications entre l’Afrique de l’Ouest et Raqqa.

Une source, citant une source sécuritaire burkinabée proche du «dossier d’Ansaroul Islam» , a également indiqué l’affiliation du groupe de Malam à l’«État islamique au Sahel», c’est-à-dire l’État islamique dans le Grand Sahara (EIGS). Dicko et Sahraoui partagent un espace opérationnel dans le nord du Burkina, alors que le groupe de Dicko appartient à la province de Soum et le groupe Sahraoui s’active plutôt dans la province d’Oudalan. Sahraoui a revendiqué deux attaques sur le sol burkinabé: Une attaque d’un poste de douane perpétrée le premier septembre dernier 2016 à Markoye, et une deuxième perpétrée le 12 octobre de la même année, contre un poste d’armée à Intagom. Ce groupe a pour rappel, prêté allégeance à al-Baghdadi en mai 2015.

En outre, le journal mauritanien Al-Akhbar a rapporté ( de ses sources), que le groupe de Dicko, nommé «Ançar Allah», avait l’intention de prêter allégeance à l’EI, tout en indiquant qu’il n’était pas précisé que le serment devait être prêté directement à Al-Baghdadi ou à (comme indiqué) l'”État islamique en Afrique de l’Ouest” dirigé par al-Sahraoui. Cependant, une communication officielle avec un serment d’allégeance émanant du Burkina reste à voir. Jusqu’à présent aucune preuve palpable ne montre que Ansaroul Islam pourrait rejoindre l’État islamique.

Récemment, des combattants de l’Ansaroul Islam de Dicko ont rencontré à Indaki, au Mali, près de la frontière tri-étatique, un groupe de jihadistes de la zone, et Almansour Ag Alkassoum– un quarantenaire Touareg– également commandant et cerveau de ce groupe. Un autre individu inconnu qui a vécu ou a été enregistré au camp de réfugiés de Mentao au Burkina Faso, était également présent à cette réunion.

Alkassoum a un rôle de coordinateur parmi les sarayas (unités) actives dans le Gourma et l’Haïre. Alkassoum est issu de la tribu Imghad et originaire du village de Madiakoye, le chef-lieu de la commune Séréré, située juste au sud de la fleuve Niger et à environ soixante-dix kilomètres à l’est de Tombouctou. Il opère avec d’autres Touaregs de la tribu Imouchag, Bellahs du Gourma, Peuls de Séno Mango et Bambaras du mouvement Dawa venant de Bamako. Ensemble, ces unités opèrant dans la zone constituent la katiba (brigade) d’Ansar Dine nommé Ansar Dine Sud ou «Sud de la fleuve» (à ne pas confondre avec la Katiba Macina). La katiba d’Alkassoum a été responsable de multiples attaques contre les forces maliennes et la MINUSMA dans la région, s’étendant de Gourma-Rharous au nord jusqu’à Douentza au sud.

Il est fortement supposé que la rencontre entre les hommes de Dicko et le groupe dirigé par Alkassoum s’est axée sur l’Ansaroul Islam qui s’unit avec JNIM. Il est à noter que la zone d’Indaki, plus précisément à Tin Téhégrin, a connu des affrontements entre une patrouille tripartite et des présumés jihadistes le 7 avril. Aucun bilan ou détails n’a été communiqué sur ces affrontements.

Toutefois, la question de savoir si la relation entre Ansaroul Islam et JNIM aurait pu changer après les événements récents dans la zone frontalière, subsiste toujours. Pendant ce temps, les résultats des opérations militaires tripartites signalées par le Ministère de la Défense français, font état de “.. saisies de matériel, neutralisation de deux terroristes, capture de 8 autres ainsi que plusieurs dizaines de suspects remis aux autorités burkinabèes.” Le journal en ligne malien Nord Sud Journal a signalé, à ce propos, que plus de deux cents suspects ont été arrêtés dans la forêt de Fhero et dans les villages environnants, alors que les villageois ont été témoins d’une présence encore visible des djihadistes dans la zone, en particulier à Douna, alors que les opérations de ratissage et de fouilles dans la zone ont pris fin.

The post Burkina Faso: Ansaroul Islam prêtera-t-il allégeance à l’État islamique? appeared first on MENASTREAM.

Early on Sunday morning, an attack by unknown gunmen targeted a Malian army position in Almoustarat, located in the Tilemsi Valley, Gao Region, about 150km north of the regional capital Gao. The assailants cut off the local telephone network hampering communications from the village and also reporting about the events that had taken place. A not uncommon measure taken by jihadists and bandits in connection to armed attacks in the region.

Local media reported that a booby-trapped vehicle struck the Malian army position, causing panic among the soldiers with some fleeing towards Bourem. The provisional casualty toll reported late on Sunday counted 7 dead soldiers, 17 severely wounded (2 in a state of coma), 16 gone missing, and 3 pick-ups with heavy weapons mounted and ammunition seized. French Barkhane forces dispatched to the site of the attack evacuated the wounded to Gao.

The Group for Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) claimed responsibility for the attack – The assault targeted a base used as staging area for combing operations against the Mujahideen, and as a recruitment center for spies and agents working for the benefit of occupying Barkhane forces, but also the exacerbated frequency and widths of public violations of Muslim sanctities in the town, the statement said. Further, the attack was carried out from multiple axes, initiated with a Suicide Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device (SVBIED) striking the garrison headquarters (perpetrator named by his nom de guerre Ahmad al-Ansari), followed by groups of ‘inghimasiyyin’ (commandos) and raiders who completely destroyed and burned the barracks, 7 vehicles and 2 trucks and also seized weapons and military material before returning to safety, the statement continued.

This is not the first time Malian forces have been attacked in Almoustarat, on March 25 unknown gunmen attacked an army checkpoint leaving 3 soldiers dead and 4 wounded. The presence of Malian government forces is highly contested in the area, not just by jihadists, but also armed groups, drug traffickers and smugglers. The Tilemsi Valley functions as a transit hub for trafficking routes and connects the regions of Gao and Kidal, therefore of strategic importance.

Just a few days ago on May 3, was the MINUSMA ‘Super Camp’ in Timbuktu subjected to a mortar barrage which left 1 peacekeeper dead and 9 wounded, JNIM claimed responsibility.

The post Mali: Multipronged attack on Malian army base in Almoustarat appeared first on MENASTREAM.

In a previously unpublished “proof of life” video named “Appeal of the detainees”, dated October 1, 2017 by Al-Zallaqa, the media wing of Jama’ah Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) – Malian soldiers held in captivity by the group, appeal to the Malian people, the Malian government and in particular the president Ibrahim Boubacar Keita for help to find a solution, or as one of the prisoners stated “we call on each and every one of the Malian people for help in order to “bring us out of this crisis”.

The recording begins with an obligatory Qur’an quote, this in particular frequently used in the context of taking prisoners of war:

“So when you meet those who disbelieve [in battle], strike [their] necks until, when you have inflicted slaughter upon them, then secure their bonds, and either [confer] favor afterwards or ransom [them] until the war lays down its burdens. That [is the command].” (Qur’an 47:4)

All prisoners give short testimonies, mentioning their rank, name, service number, and also the date and location of their capture, the largest group included five taken prisoners amidst a mass-casualty attack in Nampala last summer, with combat footage and sequences showing the capture of some of the soldiers, although those taken in Nampala were already featured in a previous release about two weeks after the attack. The prisoners look to be in relatively good shape considering the circumstances and having spent almost one and a half year in captivity, without disregarding the heavy emotional toll levied on the prisoners.

A second group of prisoners consisted of three soldiers captured amidst another mass-casualty attack, namely in Boulkessi on March 5 earlier this year, the first attack claimed by Jama’ah Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, just two days after the formalization of the merger between four jihadist factions active in Mali and in the border areas of Niger and Burkina Faso.

Three other soldiers were taken in three separate incidents, one during an ambush on the road between Diabaly and Nampala, the second amidst last year’s prison break in Banamba and a third taken in Boulkessi in early November last year under unclear circumstances.

Some of the prisoners mentioned in their testimonies that they were held by “Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin”. Several of the prisoners were given the oppurtunity to greet their families including wifes, children, parents, friends and collegues. Obvious and understandable, a unison and desperate call for help with hope of being released, although under the watchful eye of their captivators.

Currently there are as already mentioned eleven Malian soldiers, and five foreign nationals held by JNIM as publicized by the organization, although the fate of U.S. citizen Jeffrey Woodke and the identity of his captivators remains unknown.

Below is a list detailing name, date and location of the capture as well as images of the eleven Malian soldiers held in JNIM captivity.

Nampala – July 19, 2016. Abderrahmane Coulibaly, Boubacar Kanté, Kassim Sanogo, Mar Sangaré and Bakary Diaka.

Boulkessi – November 5, 2016. Jouma Touré.

Banamba – November 6-7, 2016. Abdollahi Bisam.

Diabaly – Nampala transit route December 26, 2016. Abla Maïga.

Boulkessi – March 5, 2017. Moussa Diarra, Boureïma Samaké and another Boureïma Samaké.

The post Mali: Malian soldiers held in captivity by JNIM appeal for their release appeared first on MENASTREAM.

A recently published video shows militants of the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) displaying technicals belonging to the Tuareg Imghad and Allies Self-defence Group (GATIA), seized following an attack on a GATIA post in Ahina on December 22, 2017, according to the secretary general of GATIA, Fahad Ag Almahmoud. A vehicle is said to have been recovered in Intameda, also according Ag Almahmoud, this points to that the assailants were members of Katiba Salaheddine led by Sultan Ould Badi, a group that previously was affiliated with Jama’ah Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), but pledged allegiance to the Islamic State and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi sometime around mid-2017, and consequently joined ISGS.

On June 21, presumed ISGS militants ambushed a convoy of the Movement for the Salvation of Azawad (MSA) in the area of Tamalat-Azar near the Nigerien border about 160km east of Menaka, reports speak of at least eleven dead in the ranks of MSA. Meanwhile, MSA acknowledged dead in its ranks but failed to provide a toll, this while claiming to have ”neutralized more than ten bandits”.

One of the combatants sitting on a motorbike also took part in an attack against the Nigerien gendarmerie in Ayorou on October 21, 2017, then he operated a Doshka machine gun mounted on a Toyota Land Cruiser pickup truck. The presence of a Katiba Salaheddine member (presumably more) amidst the attack in Ayorou further indicates that reinforcements received from Katiba Salaheddine and Katiba Macina defectors significantly contributed to increase the capabilities of ISGS, reflected by a number of mass-casualty attacks in 2017. The attack in Ayorou took place two and a half weeks after the deadly ambush against joint forces of U.S. Green Berets and the Nigerien army in Tongo Tongo. One of the attackers in Ayorou sported what strongly resembled an M4 carbine, supposedly seized amidst the ambush in Tongo Tongo.

The militants in the video take turns expressing some slogan-like phrases such as ”O Boubacar Keita (Mali’s president), O they who fight the soldiers of God, O they who fight the Islamic State, here is the booty of the enemy GATIA..”, another one says ”We brought you men who love to die in the cause of God more than you love life”, ”this is the booty of the apostates who fight the Islamic State”, and so on.

The post Video: Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) shows off booty taken from GATIA appeared first on MENASTREAM.

Since its founding in May 2015, the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) has neither created any media wing nor has the Islamic State (Central) media office issued any statements or reports via its newswire Amaq in order to claim responsibility for any military operations on behalf of ISGS. However, the group has claimed responsibility for its operations through other channels including the Mauritanian news agencies Al-Akhbar and ANI, the international news agency Agence France-Presse (AFP), and by a written letter posted on Whatsapp. Two videos have also been produced, namely ”Ghazwa* Tongo Tongo” and ”Ghazwa Ayorou”. We thought it may be useful to gather all claimed attacks for reference at one place, accompanied by an infographic that shows their geographic distribution.

* Ghazwa is a Quranic term for battle or military expedition

May 16, 2018:  Unknown gunmen abducted Imouchag notable Hamada Ag Mohamed in the village of Tin Habou, worth noting that the concerned individual together with other local notables announced that they had left GATIA to join HCUA the day before. In a written statement attributed to ISGS, the group claimed that it had executed Ag Mohamed. (Claimed responsibility on May 23, 2018)

April 29, 2018: Unknown gunmen assassinated the subprefect of Ouinerden, Alhassane Ag Ibrahim also known as ”Toubeyssi” at his home in Gossi. ISGS claimed responsibility. Ag Ibrahim led the Malian army detachment that arrested MUJAO police chief Aliou Mahamar Touré in December 2013 near Gossi. (Claimed responsibility on May 23, 2018)

April 15, 2018: Unknown gunmen aboard a motorbike assassinated GATIA field commander Mohamed Yousef Ag Nouh also called ‘Akhalshosh’ at an auto repair workshop in Gossi (Gourma-Rharous), Tombouctou Region. ISGS claimed responsibility for the assassination. (Claimed responsibility on April 22, 2018)

April 12, 2018: Presumed Ansaroul Islam militants attacked the school in Bouro (Nassoumbou), Soum Province, one student was killed and a teacher abducted. ISGS claimed responsibility. (Claimed responsibility on April 18, 2018)

April 8, 2018: Presumed Ansaroul Islam militants assassinated the mayor of Koutougou outside his home just after he had left the local mosque, ISGS claimed responsibility. (Claimed responsibility on April 18, 2018)

January 11, 2018: An ISGS militant carried out a suicide attack by detonating a booby-trapped vehicle (covert pickup truck) against a convoy of French Operation Barkhane forces between Ménaka and Indelimane, wounding three soldiers. (Claimed responsibility on January 12, 2018)

October 21, 2017: ISGS militants raided the gendarmerie headquarters in Ayorou, Tillabéri Region, killing 13 and wounding 5 gendarmes, seizing three vehicles, arms, ammunition and other military materiel as ”spoils of war”. Three militants were killed in the attack. (Claimed responsibility on January 12, 2018)

October 4, 2017: ISGS militants ambushed a convoy of joint forces of the U.S. Green Berets and the Nigerien army in Tongo Tongo, Tillabéri Region, near the Malian border, killing four U.S. special forces (Green Berets) soldiers, four Nigerien soldiers and an interpreter, and wounding others, a headcam containing combat footage, arms and other military equipment were seized as ”spoils of war”. A DoD investigation estimated that 20-25 militants were killed in the battle. (Claimed responsibility on January 12, 2018)

July 9, 2017: Presumed militants ambushed a Malian army convoy in the area of I-n-Kadagotan, axis Menaka-Anderamboukane, three soldiers were killed in the attack and eight others were found on July 18, supposedly executed. ISGS claimed responsibility. (Claimed responsibility on January 12, 2018)

May 31, 2017: ISGS militants raided the gendarmerie camp in Abala, Tillabéri Region, killing at least four gendarmes and two national guards, and seizing four vehicles, arms and ammunition as ”spoils of war”. (Claimed responsibility on January 12, 2018)

March 6, 2017: ISGS militants raided a position of the Nigerien gendarmerie between the villages of Wanzarbe and Yatakala, in the area of Bankilare, Tillabéri Region, near the borders with Mali and Burkina Faso, killing seven gendarmes, wounding four others, destroying a vehicle, and seizing arms and ammunition as ”spoils of war”. (Claimed responsibility on January 12, 2018)

February 22, 2017: ISGS militants ambushed a convoy of the Nigerien army near the village of Tirzawane near the Malian border, killing 16 soldiers and wounding 18 others, four vehicles were destroyed; and seven vehicles, arms, and ammunition seized as ”spoils of war”. (Claimed responsibility on January 12, 2018)

October 17, 2016: ISGS militants attacked the Koutoukale high-security prison, supposedly an attempt to free imprisoned militants, one attacker equipped with an explosive belt was killed during the attack and two guards wounded. (Claimed responsibility on October 18, 2016)

October 12, 2016: ISGS militants attacked a military outpost in Intangom, Oudalan province, killing four soldiers and a civilian, in response, security forces mistakenly killed two civilians, the attackers reportedly fled toward Mali after the attack. (Claimed responsibility on October 14, 2016)

September 2, 2016: ISGS militants attacked a customs office in Markoye, Oudalan province, killing a customs agent and civilian and wounding three other customs agents. (Claimed responsibility on September 3, 2016)

Note that the claimed attacks only account for a fractional part of the attacks and acts of ISGS

The post Attacks claimed by the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) appeared first on MENASTREAM.

Katiba Salaheddine’s second video was released on June 24, entitled ”Response to Aggression by MSA and GATIA”. The group’s first video was published the day before, showcasing two GATIA technicals taken as ”spoils of war”, reportedly amidst clashes on December 22, 2017, in the area of Ahina, rural Gao. Katiba Salaheddine is led by Sultan Ould Badi, a Malian militant, with a reputation for trafficking activities, he joined Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in 2009, and co-founded the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) in 2011 with late Al-Mourabitoun Emir, Abderrahmane Ould el Amar, also known as ”Ahmed Tilemsi”. Katiba Salaheddine draws most of its members from various Arab tribes and the Fulani, although the leader Ould Badi is of mixed Arab and Tuareg descent, namely the subfactions Ahel Taleb (Tilemsi Arab) and Taghat Mellet (Ifoghas Tuareg confederation). Although barely legible, a blue text displayed on the video screen explicitly states that the fighters seen taking turns firing rounds are Arabs and Fulani.

The date and location of the combat displayed in this latest video have not yet been verified, presumably not a recent recording. Several confrontations took place in late 2017 and earlier this year between Katiba Salaheddine and the militia coalition, supported by French forces of Operation Barkhane. Notably, on February 17, was a Katiba Salaheddine base destroyed in the area of Intameda amidst a joint operation, which left ten militants dead. Katiba Salaheddine and GATIA regularly trade abductions of members of the communities perceived as being close to each group.

It is worth noting that Katiba Salaheddine sometime in mid-2017 pledged allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and the Islamic State, consequently joining the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), to which it has contributed with reinforcements. ISGS has through various channels claimed responsibility for 15 attacks in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso since 2016, although the operations claimed only constitute a fraction of the attacks and acts carried out. ISGS including Katiba Salaheddine was subjected to intense counter-militancy operations during the first quarter of 2018 and has sustained significant losses. However, militant groups operating in the Sahel have a remarkable ability to recover, replenish, and resume action, this due to a multitude of contributing factors. These groups draw upon experience from the parent organization AQIM, which (including predecessors) has developed considerable knowledge in conducting insurgency warfare over close to three decades, deeply enmeshed in the social fabric, and given the opportunity to configure local dynamics amidst the jihadi takeover of northern Mali. The space where they operate provides an ideal template, characterized by a general lawlessness, abuses by government forces and militias, intercommunal violence rooted in fights over scarce resources and trafficking routes, and for some communities, an urgent need for community protection.

Meanwhile, French forces Operation Barkhane continue to conduct simultaneous operations alongside Malian forces in the areas of Ansongo and Menaka, and together with Nigerien forces in the area of Ouallam, however, the main focus has largely shifted toward the Gourma where joint forces of Operation Barkhane, the Malian army, and GATIA are pursuing ISGS elements and members of other militant factions. The Gourma is the home turf of an Ansar Dine katiba led by Imghad Tuareg Almansour Ag Alkassoum (Alkassoum functions as liaison between katibas in the Gourma, Haire and Burkina Faso), Al-Mourabitoun is also present, and ISGS has a local branch under the command of Abdelhakim Al-Sahrawi with a zone of influence stretching across the border into Burkina Faso’s Oudalan Province. Amidst pressure in the Mali-Niger borderlands, ISGS has made inroads into eastern Burkina Faso, presumably by crossing the border from southern Tillabery in western Niger, it also appears that there is an Ansaroul Islam component contributing to the emergence of militant activity in Burkina Faso’s east.

In the Menaka region, the Dawsahak community was subjected to a number of massacres that followed joint counter-militancy operations. These operations were accompanied by abuses against the Fulani in the Mali-Niger borderland. The conflict also spread further north and triggered intercommunal violence between Arabs and Dawsahak in the Cercle of Ansongo.

In the Gourma, abductions and assassinations targeting the Imghad community has surged in recent months, which raises concerns about an extending perimeter of instability. Operations in the Gourma and Arabanda which began two weeks ago and military movements by  GATIA have sparked unrest among Arabs. From Taoudenit to Tilemsi, critical voices have been raised with various degrees of heated rhetoric, some have the perception that the drums of war are beating.

The post Video: Another video released by Katiba Salaheddine (ISGS) – ”Response to Aggression by MSA and GATIA” appeared first on MENASTREAM.

Timely, two days ahead of Mali’s presidential elections, the emir of Jama’ah Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), Iyad Ag Ghaly made his first appearance since the announcement of the merger in March last year, which gathered several militant factions into a Sahelian jihadi conglomerate. A beard grey of age and whitened by the sun, cut into a montage of wooden blinds with a laptop placed on a table in front, the long-serving Tuareg sheik and militant leader began to read out his speech accompanied by gusts of the desert wind and reflections of sun rays and silhouettes of tree leaves and branches waving above.

The multifaceted political message delivered was motivated by expectations on the jihadi alliance to clarify its stance amidst major political events and developments in Mali, while underscoring that the issue of the soon to be held elections already had been addressed in a previous message by the group’s Moroccan qadi (judge) Ali Maychou, more commonly known by his nom de guerre Abu Abderrahmane Al-Sanhaji or Al-Maghribi. Ag Ghaly dismissed the forthcoming elections as a mirage that only exploits people’s illusions, a democratic process which the Shariah opposes, further advising the audience that religion is the right way. Al-Sanhaji had earlier urged Malians to boycott the elections since they only would maintain a system of corruption, oppression, and continued French occupation, the only solution is jihad, according to Al-Sanhaji.

On the field, the group has suffered a series of tactical defeats with a dozen senior and mid-level commanders killed so far in 2018, and it had limited success in terms of outcome of the military operations where significant means were deployed, although the complex attack against the Burkinabe army’s Chief of Staff (EMGA) headquarters, the failed assault on the French Embassy in Ouagadougou in March this year, and the complex attack which destroyed the G5Sahel-Force headquarters in Sevaré a month ago were highly symbolic and indicated that the group maintained significant operational capabilities and the ability to strike hard targets across the subregion. Nevertheless, Ag Ghaly proclaimed that France had failed in achieving its goals and that the prolonged “occupation” and the numerous operations only had multiplied the ranks and popular support for the “mujahideen”, additionally, militant expansion in neighboring Burkina Faso and Niger. In light of the alleged failure on the part of France, Ag Ghaly accused the former colonial power of letting the Malian army commit massacres in Macina, Boulkessi and elsewhere, crimes that Ag Ghaly promised not to be left unanswered. Considering France’s central role in Mali, one gets a bit confounded that France does not use its leverage to pressure Malian authorities to put an end to these practices, essentially this is not a recent phenomenon. Indeed, France did not hasten to express concerns over the massacres in Nantaka and Kobaka, Mopti, preceded by Canada and the United States. Meanwhile, Ag Ghaly puts further blame on France for igniting an ethnic and tribal war, or a war of jahiliyyah, referencing the tribal wars during the “age of ignorance” in pre-Islamic Arabia. To be seen in the light of France’s training and support of local militias engaged in hyper-localized conflicts catalyzed by political and tribal dividends, conflicts that currently are playing out in the Mali-Niger borderlands, rural Gao, and the Gourma.

Ag Ghaly warns the people in Mali and Azawad about diverting from the objective to fight the “crusaders” and their allies, with a reminder of the punishment for killing fellow Muslims, citing the Quran on the subject of killing believers.

But whoever deliberately slays another believer, his requital shall be hell, therein to abide; and God will condemn him, and will reject him, and will prepare for him awesome suffering. (Surah An-Nisa 4:93)

Thus, a pointer to the massacres that have taken place across northern and central Mali. Mass atrocities have been perpetrated by government forces, ethnic-based militias, and militants including ISGS and JNIM itself, although in the case of JNIM supposedly unintentional IED attacks that nevertheless have caused carnage with large numbers of civilian victims. In the context of ethnic and tribal fighting and collaboration with French forces of Operation Barkhane, Ag Ghaly calls on movements and militias who have allied with France to repent and return to their religion. Presumably, a communication primarily intended for armed groups in the north where such a message would have more penetrative power and potentially a more significant impact vis-à-vis militias composed of Dozos, Dogon, and Bambara in central Mali. While the militias, the Movement for the Salvation of Azawad (MSA) and the Tuareg Imghad and Allies Self-defence Group (GATIA) have conducted counter-militancy operations alongside Operation Barkhane or under French air cover against the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), JNIM has largely been on the sideline, with only limited armed engagements with the aforementioned militias. However, in this context JNIM appears to portray itself as a broker, at the same time a subtle outreach which could be translated as the need for support, contradicting previous statements.

Ag Ghaly took the opportunity to express his support for imprisoned members who he calls on to stand firm, and says that no efforts will be spared to free them, note that JNIM constituent Katiba Macina freed prisoners in Banamba in late 2016 and that a senior Al-Mourabitoun cadre and former spokesperson made a breakout recently from the high-security prison in Koutoukalé, Niger.

A central focus of JNIM has been the launch and operationalization of the G5Sahel-Force, clearly reflected by the complex attacks in Ouagadougou and Sevaré, Ag Ghaly took the opportunity to lambast those Muslim countries that have provided the nascent regional counter-terrorism force with financial aid, materiel and other forms of support. He goes on by saying that war on Islam is a global war, and the G5Sahel-Force a device set up to eliminate the Islamic project in Mali. Ag Ghaly’s Algerian deputy, Yahya Abu al-Hammam, earlier described the G5Sahel-Force as another French intervention succeeding Operation Serval and Barkhane.

Ag Ghaly concluded his speech by articulating his support for the people in Gaza and Al-Quds (Jerusalem), forwarding thoughts and prayers for victory in defending Islamic sanctities. This in accordance with JNIM’s template for visual recordings which end with “Here we begin..and at Al-Aqsa we meet”.

The post Mali: “The old man of the mountain” appeared first on MENASTREAM.

In the evening of July 25, an unknown aircraft conducted an airstrike that struck a vehicle in front of a house in the Al-Sharib district of Ubari. An area mainly inhabited by Libyan and Malian Tuareg. The airstrike briefly interrupted electricity and telecommunications. The air raid was initially assumed to have been carried out by the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM), considering recent U.S. action on March 24 in a nearby area of Ubari, an airstrike that killed two militants of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) including the Algerian senior commander Moussa Bourahla, known by his nom de guerre ”Musa Abu Dawud”. However, AFRICOM denied responsibility for the latest airstrike in a communication to Airwars. U.S. denial strongly points to France as the author of the operation, taking into account previous action and its strategic interests in the region, although this has still not been confirmed.

Speculations have gone wild about the target of the airstrike and individuals killed. Some Libyan news outlets reported that six individuals including three Malians, two Algerians and a Libyan named as ”Abu Laith al-Libi” had been killed, while others said that the deputy emir of Jama’ah Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin and the emir of AQIM’s Sahara Region, Yahya Abu al-Hammam (Djamel Okacha) had been targeted together with Katibat al-Furqan commander Talha al-Mauritani. A source close to AQIM acknowledged in a communication (published on Twitter by French researcher Romain Caillet) that Abu al-Hammam and Al-Mauritani were those targeted, although not present in Libya, but on Malian soil fighting the ”occupying Crusaders”, the same source further indicated that the airstrike had been carried out by United Arab Emirates. However, according to information received by MENASTREAM, there was only one individual killed in the Ubari strike, namely AQIM commander Ramzi Mansour, a Tunisian going by the nom de guerre Ramzi al-Tunisi, an aide of late Moussa Bourahla, killed in the previously mentioned airstrike by the U.S. in Ubari. Another Tunisian, late Al-Mourabitoun member Mokhtar Akkouri was killed in an airstrike in Gardhah al-Shati in November 2016.

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On July 29, French forces of Operation Barkhane conducted a military operation in the Tilemsi Valley, specifically in the area of Ersane near Tabankort, Gao Region. The operation was initiated by an airstrike followed by a ground assault. The operation resulted in the killing of Himama Ould Lekhweir (alt. Hamama Ould al-Khuwayyir) and at least thirteen of his associates, all Tilemsi Arabs including seven from Ould Lekhweir’s Lemhar tribe and six others from the Ladim tribe, according to tribal sources. However, the death of Ould Lekhweir was refuted by Jama’ah Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), as reported on Twitter by Mauritanian journalist Mohamed Mahmoud Abu al-Maaly. Ould Lekhweir was a former member of the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) and in particular the katiba (brigade) ”Oussama Ben Laden”. Regardless of the confusion about Ould Lekhweir’s fate, the death toll following the operation stands at fourteen killed and at least two combatants taken prisoners.

In August 2013, MUJAO merged with Mokhtar Belmokhtar’s Al-Muwaqq’iun bi-Dima into Al-Mourabitoun, the merger was arranged in connection with two coordinated attacks against the Areva-operated uranium mine in Arlit and Nigerien army barracks in Agadez, Niger. Ould Lekhweir had a record of trafficking and was a close associate of late MUJAO-founder and Al-Mourabitoun emir Abderrahmane Ould El Amar (”Ahmed al-Tilemsi”). Ould Lekhweir was arrested in 2010 amidst a major counter-trafficking operation in the area of Lemzareb, Mauritania, but subsequently released.

Himama Ould Lekhweir (”Hamza al-Tabankorti”) has been described as an explosives expert and potential successor of late Al-Mourabitoun emir and JNIM co-founder Mohamed Lahbous (”Mohamed Ould Nouini”), Lahbous was a military commander who among other responsibilities directed the group’s regional operations, such as the attacks in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso and Grand-Bassam, Ivory Coast. Lahbous was killed together with several other senior JNIM commanders and fighters amidst a coordinated Barkhane operation on February 14 against targets in the areas of Tin Zaouatene, Boughessa, and Aouhou.

Moreover, this operation came in the wake of a presumed French airstrike a week ago in the southern Libyan town of Ubari, a strike which targeted the leadership of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in Libya. Ramzi Mansour (”Ramzi al-Tunisi”), a senior Tunisian AQIM commander was killed in the strike. Al-Tunisi was a recruiter, trainer, and facilitator considered to be the organization’s number three in Libya, The organization’s Algerian top leader in Libya, Moussa Bourahla was killed in a previous strike on March 24, also in Ubari, for which the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) announced its responsibility.

Abderrahmane Ould El Amar was known as Ahmed al-Tilemsi, killed amidst Barkhane operation on December 11, 2014 in Tabankort of the Tilemsi Valley, Gao Region

Mohamed Lahbous was known as Mohamed Ould Nouini and Hassan al-Ansari/al-Tabankorti, killed amidst Barkhane operation on February 14, 2018, in the area of I-n-Aralouas, extreme north Kidal Region, near Tin Zaouatene on the Algerian border

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Early on the morning of August 26, French forces of operation Barkhane conducted a combined air-ground operation between Infoukaretane and Labouta, about 30km south of Ménaka. Two Mirage 2000 fighter jets carried out an air raid followed by action on the ground by commandos. The operation resulted in the death of a senior commander of the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), namely Mohamed ”Atinka” Ag Almouner and one of his guard corps. In addition to the nickname ”Atinka”, Ag Almouner was referred to as ”Le Réseau”, a French word meaning the network.  The member of the guard corps killed has been named as Mouta, the son of a prominent marabout in Infoukaretane. Two civilians including a woman and a child were also killed in the airstrike, the French General Staff of the Armies said that it had opened an investigation because of the civilian fatalities. Two more civilians and a militant were wounded amid the operation, subsequently provided medical care by Barkhane’s medical staff.

Ag Almouner from the Idoguiritane fraction of Dawsahak tribe was one of Adnan Abu Walid al-Sahrawi’s most senior lieutenants, identified as having played a leading role in the ambush on October 4, 2017, against a joint force of U.S. Green Berets and the Nigerien army in Tongo Tongo, Niger. An earlier article by the New York Times stated that Ag Almouner was killed in Tongo Tongo, citing American military officials. In the same way, another article by the New York Times stated that the Nigerien ISGS commander, Dando Cheffou ”may be in custody”. Ultimately, none of the reports were proven to be correct. Local sources further confirmed that Al Mahmoud ”Ikaray” Ag Baye who was a superior commander of Ag Almouner is still alive, in contrast to the U.S. assessment that he also had been killed in the Tongo Tongo ambush.

In late March this year, Nigerien gendarmes on a routine patrol in the small village of Wedi Bangou, Tillabery, arrested a group of men, some of them were armed, the gendarmes blindfolded and lined them up on the ground in the vicinity of the gendarmerie. During the interrogations, a young man caught the attention of the interrogators who suspected it was Ibrahim Ousmane, more commonly known as Dando Cheffou, prompting the Nigeriens to alert the Americans, believing that they finally had got their hands on the American hostage Jeffrey Woodke’s suspected caretaker. However, at the time was Cheffou traveling in a convoy with his senior commander Illiassou Djibo, also known as Petit Chafori, spotted while passing through a hamlet in a valley not far from the Malian border, an area which serves as a base for the ISGS militants.

Between February and early April 2018, ISGS was the target of intense counter-militancy operations spearheaded by Barkhane, aided by a coalition of local militias including the Movement for the Salvation of Azawad (MSA) and the Tuareg Imghad and Allies Self-defence Group (GATIA). However, these operations were followed by a series of mass atrocities in the Mali-Niger borderlands, the violence soon spread to rural Gao, and later to Gourma and Arabanda.

The losses suffered by ISGS have caused a quasi-breakdown in its ranks. On August 11, the Algerian Ministry of National Defense (MDN) announced that Sultan Ould Badi, the commander of ISGS constituent Katiba Salaheddine, had surrendered to the military authorities in Tamanrasset, Algeria. A report by France 24 suggested that Ould Badi had been captured in late June amidst an operation by the Algerian army, although Ould Badi turned himself in within the frame of a negotiated settlement with the Algerian authorities together with three of his associates. Ould Badi and his companions were spotted near Aguelhok in early August while traveling from the Tilemsi Valley toward the Algerian border.

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Seifallah Ben Hassine, commonly known as Abu Iyadh al-Tunisi—one of North Africa’s most influential jihadi ideologues—is confirmed to have been killed on February 21, in northern Mali.

A senior Tunisian Al-Qaida member, Afghanistan veteran, and founder of the Islamist organization Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia (AST) is now confirmed to have been killed in an operation by French forces in the area of El Aklé, nearly 300km northwest of Timbuktu, Mali, on the border with Mauritania.

In the wake of the Tunisian Revolution in 2011, Abu Iyadh founded AST and mobilized tens of thousands of Islamists. In mid-August 2012, Abu Iyadh hosted late Bahraini Islamic State ideologue Turki al-Bin’ali in his hometown of Menzel Bourguiba, a month later, he commanded the assault on the U.S. embassy in Tunis. The following year, two political assassinations of the opposition politicians Chokri Belaid and Mohamed Brahmi took place, Abu Iyad is among the primary suspects to have planned the assassinations. Abu Iyadh escaped arrest attempts twice and the Tunisian government declared AST a terrorist organization in 2013. Since then, the whereabouts of Abu Iyadh have been shrouded in mystery after he fled Tunisia for Libya. In fact, he was announced dead in 2015, although he wasn’t.

Mohamed al-Zahawi, founder of AST’s brother organization in Libya, Ansar al-Sharia in Libya (ASL), sustained severe injuries during the battle of the Benina Airport in late 2014. Al-Zahawi was transported via Ajdabiya to Misrata, and received treatment in Turkey, but succumbed to his wounds. The corpse of Al-Zahawi was repatriated to Misrata for burial—Abu Iyadh present during the funeral—mourned Al-Zahawi by his side.

On June 14, 2015, the U.S. conducted an airstrike against a farm south of Ajdabiya. Both Abu Iyadh and the infamous one-eyed Algerian militant commander Mokhtar Belmokhtar were reported to have been killed in the airstrike. Eventually, those killed were local Ansar al-Sharia members. The farm belonged to another Al-Qaida veteran, namely al-Saadi Bukhazem al-Nawfali (Abu Abdallah) who in the early 2000s fought in Iraq as a member of Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad under the leadership of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Al-Nawfali was imprisoned upon return to Libya, although in the wake of the Libyan Revolution he became the emir of the Ajdabiya Shura Council which in 2016 became ’Operations Room for the Liberation of the City Ajdabiya and Support for Benghazi Rebels’. The group launched an offensive in the early summer of 2016 along the axis Ajdabiya-Benghazi, briefly taking control of a couple of villages, and claiming to have downed a helicopter (other reports indicate technical failure) of the self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA) in the area of Magrun, killing three French intelligence operatives (DGSE) and three Libyans who were aboard the aircraft.

Since the U.S. airstrike in Ajdabiya, not much has filtered regarding the fate of Abu Iyadh, at times said to be hiding in Derna, however, in mid-2016, the Tunisian news outlet Akher Khabar Online reported that Abu Iyadh managed to leave Libya for northern Mali, where he resided under the protection of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Ultimately, the report proved to be correct since Abu Iyadh now have been confirmed killed alongside Jama’ah Nusrat Al-Islam wal-Muslimin’s (JNIM) deputy emir Yahya Abu al-Hammam amidst a combined air-ground operation by French forces of Operation Barkhane.

Abu Iyadh is not the only Tunisian jihadist militant who has sought refuge in the Sahel. In November 2016, Nigerien security forces arrested his associate Wannes Ben Hassine Fékih and later extradited him to Tunisia. Fékih, accused of planning the Bardo attack in Tunis, was condemned to ten years in prison. Another former senior Ansar al-Sharia member, Moez Fezzani, met a similar fate in Sudan, his arrest was made possible through exchanges of intelligence between Italian, Sudanese, and Libyan authorities, and likewise extradited to Tunisia for prosecution, where he two months after his return was sentenced to thirty years in prison.

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Around 1300 local time on Sunday afternoon, an attempted complex attack targeted French forces in the area of Akabar, Menaka Region, not far from the border with Niger. French forces reportedly spotted and opened fire against a Suicide Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device (SVBIED) (Ouest-France), triggering a premature detonation, local sources testified about the sound of a heavy explosion echoing across the plains of rural Menaka. Enfilading small arms fire by a group of an estimated fifteen presumed Islamic State in Greater Sahara (ISGS) militants aboard motorbikes followed the detonation. Around fifteen French soldiers were wounded, mostly minor injuries, however, two were severely wounded, necessitating a strategic medical evacuation to France. The attack came as the French forces set up a security post in the area. Mirage 2000 fighter jets and a quick reaction force (QRF) deployed didn’t manage to intercept the bikers (RFI).

Yesterday’s attack constitutes the second SVBIED attack carried out by presumed ISGS militants targeting French forces. On January 11, 2018, an explosives-laden pickup truck struck a Barkhane patrol between Menaka and In-Delimane, wounding three military medics. Furthermore, it’s the fourth complex attack involving the use of SVBIEDs in the past seven weeks, the three preceding were all claimed by Jama’ah Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM). Thus, the deployment of suicide tactics is occurring at a pace not witnessed since in the wake of the French intervention
back in 2013 with Operation Serval.

During the first fortnight of February, ISGS and JNIM conducted what strongly appeared to be a coordinated campaign against the local militias of the Movement for the Salvation of Azawad (MSA) and the Tuareg Imghad and Allies Self-defence Group (GATIA), armed groups known to cooperate with the French forces. Attacks and clashes took place in Tidimbawen, Inahar, Taringuite, In-Agar, and Talataye, the coalition lost around forty men with others injured, a considerable toll within such a short time frame. Moreover, JNIM announced for the first time in public to be at war with MSA and GATIA by officially claiming responsibility for two attacks targeting the two movements which the group described as ”agents of the crusaders”, as well as previous attacks in the area, without providing further details.

While militant groups recently have suffered multiple tactical defeats and lost senior commanders (MENASTREAM), militancy is expanding in the subregion (The Conversation), notably in Burkina Faso where new fronts have opened up in the eastern and southwestern parts of the country since the beginning of last year (ACLED). A more recent development is that militants are gaining ground in the Centre-Nord Region.

In the context of militant expansion and adaptation, there are several discernible trends. The proliferation and spread of IED and landmine usage as seen in previously untouched areas such as Torodi and Ayorou in Niger’s Tillabery Region, and across several provinces in Burkina’s Est Region. Another tendency is the increasingly frequent use of explosives to destroy public infrastructure including administrative buildings, schools, and security facilities. An additional aspect is innovation, reflected by the modus operandi of booby-trapping corpses as seen on two occasions near Diankabou, Mali, and near Djibo, Burkina Faso. Part of the adaptation process is that JNIM and ISGS are increasingly melting together in order to consolidate ranks, sharing objectives and adversaries.

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